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1. Introduction  
 
(p. 779) The Taricco case is about VAT fraud. Since VAT revenue forms 
part of the EU’s own resources, VAT fraud is a matter of Union law.1 As a 
consequence, the duty to provide effective sanctions for violations of EU 
law applies to cases of VAT fraud. Because the duty under EU law to 
provide effective sanctions is usually based on Article 4(3) TEU, the 
primacy of Union law clearly precludes the application of national rules 
that would render sanctions ineffective.  
Matters are more complicated, however, when the disapplication of the 
national rules would violate a fundamental right that is protected by 
national constitutional law.
2
 In that case, underlining the precedence of the 
duty to provide effective sanctions exposes the inherent tension between 
effective sanctions and fundamental rights.
3
 It moreover reveals that a 
tension exists between EU law’s principles of effectiveness and primacy on 
the one hand, and fundamental rights as protected by national constitutions 
on the other.
4
 This tension is clearly visible when EU law requires the 
imposition of criminal penalties, because these sanctions, by definition, 
have a serious impact from the perspective of the individual. In the field of 
criminal law it is therefore widely acknowledged that fundamental rights 
provide legitimate grounds for limiting the effectiveness of sanctions. 
 
 
1. Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, paras. 25–28.   
2. Cases of “ordinary primacy” could be distinguished from cases where EU law needs 
to be given precedence over national constitutional law, see Claes, “The Primacy of EU Law 
in European and National Law” in Arnull and Chalmers (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
European Union Law (OUP, 2015), pp. 187–199.   
3. Cf. e.g. Gulliksson, “Effective Sanctions as the One-Dimensional Limit to the Ne Bis 
in Idem Principle in EU law” in Nergelius and Kristofferson (Eds.), Human Rights in 
Contemporary European Law (Hart, 2015), pp. 157–158.   
4. The most obvious recent example of this tension is Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v.  
Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107.  
  
(p. 780) That fundamental rights are allowed to limit the effectiveness of 
criminal penalties does not yet say anything about the particular limits they 
provide. These limits depend on the level of protection that is afforded to the 
applicable fundamental rights. The Taricco judgment shows that the ECJ is not 
always willing to provide a high level of fundamental rights protection. 
Instead, the Court here prioritized the primacy and effectiveness of EU law. In 
the interest of the effective penalization of serious VAT fraud, the Court, in 
fact, merely provided the ECHR’s minimum level of protection to the legality 
principle enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter. Since a higher level of 
protection would hamper the effectiveness of criminal penalties for VAT fraud, 
the Court, in effect, required Italy to make the protection of the, 
constitutionally enshrined, Italian legality principle conform to this 
minimum standard. In this regard, Taricco gives rise to comparable, yet 
more difficult, questions about the level of fundamental rights protection to 
those in the related landmark cases Case C-399/11, Melloni and Case C-
617/10, Åkerberg Fransson.  
This case note discusses the duty to provide effective criminal sanctions 
for serious cases of VAT fraud, the Court’s interpretation of the legality 
principle, and the relationship between EU fundamental rights and more 
protective national standards. 
 
 
2. Factual and legal background  
 
Ivo Taricco and others were accused of having committed VAT fraud worth 
several million euros, through trade in champagne. The accused had allegedly 
set up an organization wherein different companies and shell companies 
conducted non-existent transactions, resulting in fraudulent VAT returns. 
Taricco and others were, therefore, alleged to have taken part in a form of fraud 
known as a “VAT carousel”.
5
 According to Italian law, VAT fraud  
constitutes a criminal offence and after preliminary investigations the case had 
arrived at the stage of the preliminary hearing before the Tribunale di Cuneo 
(i.e. the referring court). The Italian court needed to decide whether the 
accused were to be committed to criminal trial.  
Although VAT fraud is clearly punishable under Italian law, the Tribunale 
di Cuneo was not convinced of its ability to commit the accused to a criminal  
trial due to the Italian rules on statutory limitation. The applicable Italian rules 
had relatively short absolute limitation periods and only allowed for a very 
 
5. For a description of this phenomenon, see Report from the Commission to the Council 
and European Parliament on the use of administrative cooperation arrangements in the fight 
against VAT fraud, COM(2004)260, pp. 5–6. 
 
 
(p. 781) narrow extension of the limitation period after criminal prosecutions 
had been initiated. Even after the initiation of a criminal investigation or 
prosecution, the absolute period of limitation could generally be extended by 
only one quarter of the original period (or, under the old rules, prior to 2005, by 
one half).
6
 Since the crimes of tax fraud involved very complex preliminary 
investigations, a final verdict by the trial court was not to be expected before  
the expiration of even the extended period of statutory limitation. According to 
the Tribunale di Cuneo, the Italian rules provided so little room for  
prosecution that they lead to de facto impunity for crimes involving 
complex investigations like tax fraud and other economic offences.  
In its preliminary reference, the Italian court essentially asked whether the 
applicable rules on statutory limitation, and the ensuing de facto impunity for 
tax fraud, were in accordance with EU law. The reference for a preliminary  
ruling indicated four grounds for a potential violation of EU law. The 
Tribunale di Cuneo first wanted to know whether the rules on statutory  
limitation amounted to either unfair competition for Italian economic 
operators as prohibited by Article 101 TFEU or constituted prohibited State 
aid under Article 107 TFEU (questions 1 and 2). In addition, the Italian 
court asked whether the limitation rules violated Directive 2006/112
7
 
(question 3) or the principle of sound public finances enshrined in Article 
119 TFEU (question 4). 
 
 
3. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott  
 
Advocate General Kokott found the referring court’s questions raised an 
additional issue, concerning the conformity of the Italian limitation rules with 
the EU law duty to provide for effective penalties for infringements of EU 
law.
8
 In order to give the referring court a useful response to its questions, a 
large part of the Opinion is dedicated to the examination of the additional 
question.
9
 An equally large part examined the related issue of the possible 
 
 
 
6. Prior to the revision of the rules on limitation introduced by Law No 251/2005, the 
limitation period could be extended by no more than half in the event of an interruption of that  
period. Opinion, para 31. See further Jarvers, “Verjährung in Italien” in Sieber and Cornils (Eds.), 
Nationales Strafrecht in rechtsvergleichender Darstellung. Allgemeiner Teil. Band 5: Gründe für 
den Ausschluss der Strafbarkeit, Aufhebung der Strafbarkeit, Verjährung (Duncker 
& Humblot, 2010), pp. 602–605.  
7. Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006 on the common system of value 
added tax, O.J. 2006, L 347/1.  
8. Opinion, paras. 73–78.  
9. Ibid., paras. 79–105.  
  
(p. 782) effects that a finding of incompatibility would entail for the 
criminal case in the main proceedings.
10  
The Advocate General distinguished between a general duty to provide for 
effective sanctions and a specific duty to provide criminal sanctions for EU 
fraud.
11
 The general duty to provide effective sanctions for violations of EU 
law is based on the duty of since cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU 
and obliges Member States to sanction EU infringements in a manner that is 
equivalent to comparable violations of national law, and is, in any event, 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
12
 Subject to these conditions, Member 
States are in principle free to choose the type of penalties (i.e. administrative  
or criminal) and these penalties can, in principle, be subjected to limitation 
periods.
13
 However, if the limitation rules have the general effect of  
precluding the sanctioning of individuals who commit VAT fraud, then VAT 
fraud would only be subject to penalties in theory, and the limitation rules  
would be contrary to the general duty for Member States to impose 
effective penalties for infringements of EU law.
14 
Advocate General Kokott identified a specific duty to provide effective 
criminal sanctions for EU fraud in Article 2(1) of the PIF Convention.
15
 
Although the Council clearly wished to exclude VAT fraud from the scope of 
the PIF Convention, as appears from an Explanatory Report to the 
Convention,
16
 the Advocate General dismissed that interpretation as non-
binding.
17
 Instead, she concluded that VAT fraud falls within the scope of the 
PIF definition on the basis of the wording and the objectives of the 
Convention.
18
 The PIF Convention leads to the same conclusion as that based 
on the general duty to provide effective sanctions: if the Italian limitation rules 
would only allow for the imposition of adequate criminal penalties in rare 
cases, those rules would also be contrary to the specific duty to provide 
effective criminal sanctions inherent in Article 2 of the Convention.
19  
The actual assessment of the effectiveness of the Italian penalties in light of 
the limitation rules is left to the referring court for obvious reasons.
20
 The 
 
10. Ibid., paras. 106–127.  
11. Ibid., para 79. Cf. Opinion, paras. 80–91 and 92–105.  
12. Ibid., para 80.  
13. Ibid., paras. 84 and 87–88.  
14. Ibid., para 91.  
15. Convention drawn up on the basis of Art. K.3 TEU, on the protection of the European 
Communities’ financial interests, signed in Luxembourg on 26 July 1995, O.J. 1995, C 316/49.  
16. Explanatory Report on the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ 
financial interests, text approved by the Council on 26 May 1997, O.J. 1997, C 191/4.  
17. Opinion, paras. 94–99.  
18. Ibid., paras. 100–103.  
19. Ibid., para 105.  
20. Cf. ibid., paras. 86, 91 and 104–106.  
 
 
(p. 783) Advocate General did, however, add extensive considerations on 
the potential impact that a finding of incompatibility with EU law would 
have on the dispute in the main proceedings.
21
 If the rules on statutory 
limitation were incompatible with the duty to provide effective sanctions 
for infringements of EU law, the referring court would either have to 
interpret those rules in accordance with EU law, or, if this proved 
impossible, it would be obliged to refrain from applying those rules.
22  
The Advocate General then examined whether the duty for the national court 
to give full effect to EU law could conflict with fundamental rights and,  
more specifically, with the legality principle of crimes and penalties (nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege) as enshrined in Article 49 of the Charter.
23
 In 
her view, the EU legality principle does not provide protection against the 
extension of applicable periods of statutory limitation, because the legality 
principle only provides standards for rules that define criminal responsibility 
and prescribe criminal penalties. The rules on statutory limitation do not define 
crimes or penalties, but merely determine the legal possibilities for the  
prosecution of a crime.
24
 It is in this crucial regard that the present case 
should be contrasted with the famous judgment in Berlusconi
25
 of which it 
is “vaguely reminiscent”.26 Unlike substantive rules that define a crime and 
prescribe a penalty, procedural rules on statutory limitation are outside the  
scope of the EU legality principle.
27
 Therefore, a statutory limitation period 
is certainly extendable as long as the original limitation period has not 
expired at the time of extension.
28  
Since the EU legality principle does not preclude the extension of a 
limitation period that has not yet expired, the national court is obliged to apply 
the rules on statutory limitations in a manner consistent with the duty to 
provide effective penalties for violations of EU law; in the Advocate General’s 
view, this could give rise to a duty for the national court to apply an “adequate 
limitation regime” instead of the applicable rules on limitation.
29
 Advocate 
General Kokott provides the national court with guidance on how to apply such 
an “adequate limitation regime”. She suggests three alternative 
 
 
 
21. Ibid, paras. 106–127.  
22. Ibid., paras. 107–112.  
23. Ibid., paras. 113–120.  
24. Ibid., para 115–116.  
25. Joined cases C-387/02, C-391/02 & C-403/02, Criminal Proceedings against Silvio 
Berlusconi and Others, EU:C:2005:270.   
26. Opinion, para 4.  
27. Ibid., paras. 115–119.  
28. Ibid., para 120.  
29. Ibid., paras. 121–124.  
 
 
(p. 784) approaches.
30
 The national court could, for example, apply the 
provisions on limitation of VAT fraud simply without the applicable absolute 
limitation  
period (suggestion 1), it could retroactively apply newly adopted rules, 
(from 2011),
31
 which have a longer limitation period (suggestion 2), or, 
alternatively, it could also apply the old rules on limitation, which existed 
prior to the 2005 revision (suggestion 3).  
Although the Advocate General focused on the additional question about the 
duty to provide effective sanctions and its implications for national criminal 
law, she examined the referring court’s explicit questions as well.
32
 She 
concluded that the inadequate enforcement of VAT penalties did not 
necessarily promote collusive conduct between undertakings and was thus not 
contrary to Article 101 TFEU (question 1).
33
 The inadequate enforcement of 
VAT rules could not amount to prohibited State aid either, because the Italian 
rules applied equally to all undertakings subject to Italian criminal law and 
were, therefore, non-selective (question 2).
34
 Moreover, the Italian limitation 
regime did not infringe Directive 2006/112 (hereafter: “the VAT Directive”)
35 
– the fact that penalties for tax fraud were hard to impose did not in itself 
amount to a tax exemption, as it did not mean the right to levy tax no longer 
existed (question 3).
36
 Finally, the Italian rules did not infringe Article 119 
TFEU, since the “soundness” of a Member State’s public finances is 
determined by an evaluation of the entirety of the national budget and not 
by exclusively looking at a specific part thereof, such as the failure to 
enforce the right to levy tax.
37 
 
 
4. Judgment of the Court  
 
Like Advocate General Kokott, the Court’s Grand Chamber focused on the 
compatibility of the Italian limitation rules with the duty to provide effective 
sanctions for VAT fraud and its effect on the main proceedings.
38
 Unlike the 
Advocate General, however, the Court did so by reformulating the referring 
court’s third question and taking it as the first element of its examination.
39 
 
30. Ibid., paras. 125–126.  
31. “… limitation periods applicable to tax offences, which have been extended by a 
third, as now provided for in Law No 148/2011”, ibid. para 126.  
32. Ibid., paras. 57–73.  
33. Ibid., para 60.  
34. Ibid., para 61.  
35. Cited supra note 7.   
36. Ibid., para 66.  
37. Ibid., paras. 70–71.  
38. Judgment, paras. 34–58.  
39. Ibid., paras. 34–35.  
 
 
(p. 785) Citing Åkerberg Fransson,
40
 the Court indicated two sources that 
enshrine a general duty to provide effective penalties for VAT fraud. First, the 
VAT Directive when read in conjunction with the duty of sincere cooperation 
enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU, and, second, Article 325 TFEU.
41
 Although 
these sources generally leave the Member States the freedom to choose  
between administrative penalties, criminal penalties, or a combination of the 
two, the Grand Chamber stressed that certain serious cases of VAT evasion 
could nevertheless necessitate the imposition of criminal penalties.
42 
In addition to a general duty to provide effective sanctions for VAT fraud,  
the ECJ found Article 2(1) of the PIF Convention to enshrine a duty to provide 
specifically for criminal penalties.
43
 The Grand Chamber confirmed the  
Advocate General’s interpretation that the broad wording of the 
Convention’s definition of fraud, together with its objective of vigorously 
combatting EU fraud, justified the conclusion that VAT fraud fell within 
the scope of the Convention.
44
 As a result, the Court identified three 
separate sources that contain a duty to provide criminal penalties for serious 
cases of VAT fraud: theVAT Directive in conjunction withArticle 
4(3)TEU,Article 325TFEU and Article 2(1) of the PIF Convention.
45  
The Court qualified the VAT evasion by Taricco and others as a case of 
serious fraud. The ECJ did not, however, establish explicit criteria that could 
be relevant in concluding that a specific form of fraud deserved the label 
“serious”. The only reason for the conclusion that the main proceedings 
involved serious fraud was the determination that the alleged fraud amounted 
to several million euros. The ECJ then underlined that, for serious cases of 
fraud, only criminal penalties would result in effective and dissuasive 
penalization.
46
 Since Italian law provides criminal penalties for VAT fraud 
with a maximum prison sentence of seven years, the Court found no reason to 
doubt the dissuasiveness of the penalties in themselves.
47
 In the ECJ’s view, 
the fact that a limitation period is provided for by Italian law does not 
 
 
 
40. Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson.   
41. Judgment, paras. 36, 37 and 39.  
42. Ibid., para 39.  
43. Ibid., paras. 40–43. Unlike most literature and the Opinion of the A.G., the Court 
referred to the Convention drawn up on the basis of Art. K.3 TEU, on the protection of the 
European Communities’ financial interests, signed in Luxembourg on 26 July 1995, O.J. 
1995, C 316/49, as the “PFI Convention”. I will nevertheless continue to refer to this 
Convention as the “PIF Convention”.   
44. Ibid., para 41.  
45. Ibid., para 47.  
46. Ibid., paras. 42–43.  
47. Ibid., para 45.  
  
(p. 786) generally deprive the applicable penalties of their effectiveness and 
dissuasiveness either.
48  
The general effectiveness and dissuasiveness of the Italian system of 
criminal penalties for VAT fraud could nevertheless be seriously hampered 
by specific circumstances. Such circumstances occur if Italian limitation 
rules result in impunity for perpetrators of serious fraud in a considerable 
number of cases because these offences are usually time-barred before a 
final conviction can be imposed.
49
 The Court underlined that, in those 
circumstances, the Italian criminal penalties would not satisfy the 
requirements of effectiveness and dissuasiveness inherent in the EU legal 
obligation to sanction. The Italian rules would also violate EU obligations if 
the prosecution of fraud cases affecting national financial interests was not 
as severely impeded by limitation rules as those at issue.
50  
In line with the Advocate General’s Opinion, the ECJ subsequently 
considered the impact that a finding of incompatibility of the Italian limitation  
regime would have on the dispute in the main proceedings.
51
 The Court 
referred to Article 325 TFEU to stress that, inter alia, primary Union law 
imposes a precise obligation to provide for effective and dissuasive 
penalties for EU fraud.
52
 By virtue of the principle of precedence of EU 
law, Italian rules depriving the criminal penalties for VAT fraud of their 
effectiveness are automatically rendered inapplicable by that provision.
53
 
This could result in an obligation for the national court to disapply the 
Italian limitation rules to give full effect to EU law.
54
 If that were the case, 
the national court would also be obliged to ensure that fundamental rights 
are respected, and more specifically, the legality principle.
55  
The Court found that the disapplication of the Italian limitation rules would 
not violate the legality principle however. Although a disapplication of the 
Italian limitation rules would allow for the imposition of a criminal penalty in 
circumstances that were not permissible under national law, the crime and the 
penalty itself would remain in accordance with the applicable Italian criminal 
law. The disapplication of the limitation rules would merely allow for the 
effective prosecution of the crimes and imposition of penalties which were, at 
 
 
48. Ibid., para 45. Cf. Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Joined cases C-387/02, C-391/02 & C-
403/02, Criminal Proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi and Others, EU:C:2004:624, paras. 
107–108. 
49. Ibid., para 47.  
50. Ibid., paras. 43 and 48.  
51. Ibid., paras. 49–58.  
52. Ibid., paras. 50–51.  
53. Ibid., para 52.  
54. Ibid., paras. 49 and 52–53.  
55. Ibid., paras. 53–54.  
 
(p. 787) the time the acts were committed, undisputedly established by Italian 
criminal law.
56
 Therefore, the Charter’s legality principle would not be 
infringed by a disapplication of the Italian rules on limitation. In addition, and 
apparently as a secondary argument, the Grand Chamber referred to the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights to underline that the legality 
principle under the ECHR allows the extension of existing limitation periods.
57  
The Grand Chamber therefore answered the third question by stating that 
the national court would be obliged to disapply the Italian limitation rules if 
these rules deprive the criminal penalties for VAT fraud of their 
effectiveness and dissuasiveness. With regard to the first, second and fourth 
questions, the ECJ’s concise response is essentially based on the answers 
proposed by the Advocate General.
58 
 
 
5. Comment  
 
5.1. The duty to provide effective sanctions: obligations to criminalize 
VAT fraud  
 
Ever since the famous Greek maize judgment, Member States have been 
unequivocally obliged to impose sanctions for infringements of EU law.
59
 In 
order to ensure the effectiveness of Union law, violations of EU law are to be 
sanctioned in the same way as similar breaches of national law.
60
 In addition to 
this so-called “assimilation principle”,
61
 Greek maize required the Member 
States to ensure that, in any event, domestic penalties were also effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.
62
 Thus, Greek maize provides two 
 
 
 
56. Ibid., para 55–56.  
57. Ibid., para 57.  
58. Ibid., paras. 59–65.  
59. Case C-68/88, Commission v. Hellenic Republic (Greek maize), EU:C:1989:339,  
para 23. 
60. Ibid., para 24.  
61. See, e.g., Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart, 2009), p. 63, Satzger, International 
and European Criminal Law (Beck, 2012), p. 71, Miettinen, Criminal Law and Policy in the 
European Union (Routledge, 2013), p. 13. The same principle is also referred to as “the   
principle of equivalence”, see Dougan, “From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist: Criminal 
Sanctions for the Enforcement of Union Law”, in Cremona (Ed.), Compliance and the 
Enforcement of EU Law (OUP, 2012), pp. 79–80 or “the equality of sanctions principle”, see 
Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd ed. (OUP, 2011), p. 770.  
62. Case C-68/88, Greek maize, para 24. The reference to the need for sanctions to be 
proportionate is not focused on in Taricco, see judgment, para 43. This is probably a result of the 
referring court’s focus on the effectiveness of penalties, see judgment, para 26. 
 
 
(p. 788) distinguishable obligations for Member States to provide certain 
types and 
levels of sanctions.
63  
The Taricco judgment confirmed that the two Greek maize criteria provide  
grounds to dismiss certain types of national sanctions for infringements of EU 
law as inadequate.
64
 In addition, Taricco makes clear that the two Greek maize 
criteria can independently oblige the Member States to prescribe criminal 
penalties for violations of EU law. Although it was already obvious that the 
Member States could be obliged to provide criminal sanctions for violations 
of Union law on the basis of the assimilation principle,
65
 the Court had not 
expressly determined that an obligation to provide criminal penalties could 
be based independently on the requirement that penalties are effective and 
dissuasive.
66  
Taricco does, however, identify the requirements of effectiveness and 
dissuasiveness as the reason for providing criminal penalties.
67
 In the Court’s 
view, VAT evasion amounting to several million euros constitutes a form of 
serious fraud for which only criminal penalties could be sufficiently effective 
and dissuasive. This means that, even when a Member State might have chosen 
to sanction forms of VAT fraud administratively, or by a combination of 
administrative and criminal penalties, EU law demands serious forms of VAT 
fraud to be sanctioned by criminal penalties. The ECJ thus clearly 
requires the criminalization of certain forms of VAT fraud.  
Article 325 TFEU has codified the Greek maize duty to provide equivalent, 
effective and dissuasive penalties for the specific case of EU fraud.
68
 Although 
it is generally denied that this provision adds substantively to the general Greek 
maize duty to provide sanctions for infringements of Union law,
69
 the  
provision is not completely without purpose either. Since Article 325 TFEU 
underlines that the effective enforcement of EU fraud is especially significant,  
it fulfils a symbolic function. This symbolic significance is, arguably, 
perceivable in Taricco, because the Court exclusively refers to the Greek 
maize duty in the form of Article 325 TFEU in most of its considerations.
70  
With regard to substance, however, the judgment treats the general Greek 
 
63. See further Klip, European Criminal Law. An Integrative Approach, 2nd ed. 
(Intersentia, 2012), pp. 73–75 and Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, 5th ed., (Springer, 
2015), pp. 248–251.   
64. Judgment, paras. 37 and 43.  
65. See e.g. Case C-186/98, Criminal proceedings against Amélia Nunes and Evangelina  
de Matos, EU:C:1999:376, paras. 7 and 14.  
66. See Dougan, op. cit. supra note 61, pp. 80–82.   
67. Judgment, para 39. This confirms the view formulated by A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
in his Opinion in Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2005:311, para 43.  
68. See paras. 1 and 2 of that provision and cf. judgment, para 37.  
69. See Dougan, op. cit. supra note 61, p. 79.   
70. Judgment, paras. 50–52 and 58.  
 
 
(p. 789) maize duty, which is based on Article 4(3) TEU, and the codified 
Greek maize duty of Article 325 TFEU as co-existing duties with the same 
content.
71  
In addition to the Greek maize duty to provide criminal penalties for serious 
forms of VAT fraud, the Grand Chamber identifies a second obligation to 
criminalize serious cases of VAT fraud. The Court finds Article 2(1) of the PIF 
Convention to contain such a duty, as VAT fraud is within the scope of the 
definition of fraud in Article 1 of the Convention.
72
 The conclusion that VAT 
fraud is within the scope of the PIF Convention is certainly significant, because 
the Convention provides additional room to oblige the Member States  
to impose criminal penalties. Article 2(1) of the Convention requires the 
criminalization not only of the committing of the forms of conduct described  
in Article 1(1), but also of the participation in, and the instigation and attempt 
of, these acts. The Convention moreover requires heads of businesses to be 
held criminally liable if their companies commit EU fraud.
73  
By concluding that VAT fraud is within the PIF definition of EU fraud, 
the ECJ has created an obligation to criminalize not only VAT fraud itself, 
but also the instigation and attempt thereof, as well as the participation 
therein. With that interpretation, the Grand Chamber clearly disregarded the 
views that the Member States expressed about the desirable scope of EU 
fraud. The Member States had already made it clear that they deemed VAT 
fraud to be beyond the scope of the PIF Convention.
74
 This unequivocal 
position has been maintained ever since. In fact, the issue whether VAT 
fraud is to be included in the definition of EU fraud proved highly 
controversial in the negotiations on the PIF Directive, which is intended to 
replace the PIF Convention. Contrary to the Commission’s proposal for the 
PIF Directive,
75
 and the European Parliament’s position,76 the Council (i.e. 
the Member States) explicitly wish to excludeVAT fraud from the scope of 
the definition of EU fraud in the PIF Directive.
77 
 
71. Ibid., para 47.  
72. Ibid., para 41.  
73. See Art. 3 of the PIF Convention.  
74. Cited supra note 15.   
75. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fight 
against fraud to the Union’s financial interest by means of criminal law, COM(2012)363, 
Recitals 4 and 5.   
76. See Information Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee/Council on the Proposal for a Directive on the fight against 
fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law – Outcome of the European 
Parliament’s first reading, 29 Apr. 2014, Interinstitutional File 2012/0193, Document 
Number: ST 9024 2014 INIT. The documents in Interinstitutional File 2012/0193 are 
accessible via <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/public-register/>.   
77. For a description of the ongoing negotiations about the PIF Directive and the position of 
the Member States about the inclusion of VAT fraud in the new PIF definition, see Note from  
  
(p. 790) The unresolved debate about the scope of the PIF definition 
shows that the Taricco case influenced the legislative process. Following 
Taricco, the  
Luxembourg Presidency issued an immediate response asking the Member 
States to reflect on its significance for the ongoing negotiations.
78
 With this 
sensitive political context in mind, which is moreover influenced by the fact 
that the PIF definition determines the competence for the future European 
Public Prosecutor,
79
 one would expect the ECJ to substantiate its interpretation 
of PIF fraud elaborately. Unlike the Advocate General, the Court did not 
employ an extensive reasoning to justify its interpretation.
80
 Instead, it used a 
single paragraph to conclude that VAT fraud fell within the 
scope of the PIF Convention. Unsurprisingly, the Court’s reasoning has not 
convinced all Member States. The Taricco judgment has not, therefore, settled  
the debate about the possibility of excluding VAT fraud from the scope of 
the PIF definition.
81
 As a consequence, this issue remains a focal point of 
the ongoing negations that resumed under the Netherlands Presidency in 
February 2016.
82 
 
5.2. The relationship between effective criminal penalties and the 
legality principle  
 
After its considerations about the distinct duties to provide for effective 
criminal penalties for VAT fraud, the ECJ provided the national court with  
guidelines to establish whether the Italian limitation regime violated EU law.
83
 
The Court used the Greek maize obligations as possible grounds for an 
 
the Presidency to the Delegations on Proposal for a Directive on the fight against fraud to the 
Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law – Examination of the Presidency document, 
29 Jan. 2016, Interinstitutional File 2012/0193, Document Number: ST 5690 2016 
INIT, pp. 3–6. 
78. See Note from the Presidency to CATS on the Proposal for a Directive on the fight 
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive) – 
Judgment in case C-105/14, Taricco, 17 Sept. 2015, Interinstitutional File 2012/0193, 
Document Number: ST 12088 2015 INIT, pp. 1–3.   
79. See Art. 12 of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, COM(2013)534 and Note from the Presidency to the 
Permanent Representatives Committee, 24 Nov. 2015, Interinstitutional File 2012/0193, 
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80. Cf. Judgment, para 41 and Opinion, paras. 94–103.  
81. See Note from the Presidency to the Delegations, cited supra note 77, pp. 5–6.   
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Number: ST 6239 2016 INIT, pp. 5–6.   
83. Tridimas would probably label the specificity of the Court’s answer as a “guidance 
case”. See about the distinguishable forms of preliminary rulings Tridimas, “Constitutional  
 
 
(p. 791) incompatibility with Union law. The national court could be obliged 
to disapply the Italian limitation rules either if these rules violated the 
assimilation principle,
84
 or if they violated the duty to provide effective and 
dissuasive sanctions.
85
 Unlike the Advocate General, the Court did not give 
general suggestions to the national court on how to give full effect to EU law if 
it were obliged to disapply the Italian limitation rules.
86
 The ECJ did, however, 
lay down additional considerations about the relationship between, essentially, 
the effectiveness of Union law and the legality principle.
87 
The duty to provide effective criminal sanctions for serious forms of VAT  
fraud, coupled with the duty to give full effect to EU law, increases the 
repressiveness of national law in the Taricco case. This increased  
repressiveness leads to a tension with fundamental rights protection in the 
main proceedings, because EU law’s effet utile might require the imposition 
of a criminal sanction that would not be possible under the applicable 
Italian rules.
88
 EU law therefore radically alters the legal possibilities to 
impose a criminal sanction to the detriment of the accused.
89
 That 
references to Union law can seriously harm the legal position of the 
individual in a national criminal case is certainly not without precedent.
90
 It 
is nevertheless important to recognize that, within the criminal sphere, 
negative effects on the position of an individual have a high impact. The 
impact on the legal position of the accused is even more dramatic where 
EU law requires the alteration or disapplication of the applicable national 
rules in a way that might violate a national constitutional standard. The 
Court’s judgment shows that it is nevertheless willing to accept such a far-
reaching negative impact on the legal position of the accused.  
That the Court might require the national court to alter the legal position of 
the accused in violation of a national constitutional standard is the result of a 
diverging interpretation of the legality principle in EU law and in Italian law. 
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(p. 792) The ECJ concluded that the EU legality principle does not provide 
protection against the extension of applicable limitation terms to the detriment 
of the accused. Underlying this conclusion is a distinction between rules that 
define crimes and penalties (i.e. rules of substantive criminal law) and 
procedural rules. Limiting the protection of the legality principle to rules of 
substantive criminal law is in line with the Court’s previous case law91 and 
with the ECtHR’s case law on Article 7 ECHR.92 The ECJ’s interpretation 
of the legality principle’s scope is therefore certainly reasonable.  
The conformity of the ECJ’s interpretation of the legality principle with 
that of the Strasbourg Court, is, moreover, in accordance with the ECJ’s 
previous case law. In the existing case law on the EU legality principle, the 
Court has explicitly reiterated parts of the ECtHR’s general considerations 
on the ECHR legality principle.
93
 That the ECJ generally
94
 follows the 
ECtHR’s interpretation of the legality principle shows that it is only willing 
to provide the minimum standard of protection.
95
 Although reasonable, the 
Court’s decision to provide merely the minimum standard of protection, 
reflects a clear choice in light of Article 52(3) of the Charter. This choice 
entails the possibility that the ECJ’s interpretation of the legality principle 
conflicts with national interpretations of that fundamental right even though 
these may be equally reasonable.
96 
 
5.3.  The potential for constitutional conflict after Taricco 
 
An actual conflict between diverging interpretations of the legality principle 
could indeed be a direct consequence of Taricco. Such a conflict is likely to 
arise because Italian law includes rules on limitation periods in the protection 
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Claes, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 203.  
 
 
(p. 793) provided by the legality principle.
97
 The ECJ’s legality interpretation, 
which might even be regarded as absolutely excluding extensions of limitation 
periods from its scope,98 therefore seems to fall short of the protection that is  
provided by the Italian legality principle.
99
 Since the Italian Corte di 
Cassazione nevertheless declared the contested limitation rules inapplicable 
after the Taricco judgment, the Milan Court of Appeal (la Corte d’appello di 
Milano) immediately asked the Constitutional Court (la Corte costituzionale) 
to rule on the conformity of the Italian rules ratifying the EU treaties with the  
legality principle enshrined in the Italian Constitution.
100
 The Constitutional 
Court is basically requested to give effect to its controlimiti doctrine, by which  
it, in essence, reserved the power to disapply EU law when it violates core 
constitutional principles.
101
 The Taricco judgment could therefore lead the 
Italian Constitutional Court to specifically reject the absolute primacy of 
Union law in order to save its interpretation of the legality principle.  
The potential constitutional conflict after Taricco bears resemblance to the 
conflict following Melloni.
102
 As is well known, Melloni and the related 
judgment in Åkerberg Fransson
103
 established that, when the Charter  
applies,
104
 more protective national constitutional standards can only apply as 
long as they do not compromise the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU 
 
 
97. See, with further references, Scalia, “Protection of Fundamental Rights and Criminal 
law. The Dialogue between the EU Court of Justice and the National Courts”, (2015) 
eucrim, 100, at 107 and Lassalle, “Taricco kills two birds with one stone for the sake of the 
PIF”, <www.europeanlawblog.eu> (last visited 16 Dec. 2015).   
98. The ECJ’s focus on the text of Art. 49(1) of the Charter, which requires crimes and 
penalties to be established by law at the time of the accused conduct, could imply an absolute  
exclusion of limitation rules from the scope of protection of the legality principle, see judgment, 
paras. 55–56. Although such an interpretation would potentially violate the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of Art. 7 ECHR, the ECtHR has never ruled explicitly that the extension of 
limitation periods for offences that have become time-barred is excluded by the legality principle, 
see e.g. Coëme and Others v. Belgium, cited supra note 88, para 149 and ECtHR, OAO 
Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Appl. No. 14902/04, judgment of 20 Sept. 2011, 
paras. 563–564, 570–571 and 575.  
99. Jarvers, “Das Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip in Italien” in Sieber and Cornils (Eds.), 
Nationales Strafrecht in rechtsvergleichender Darstellung. Allgemeiner Teil. Band 2: 
Gesetzlichkeitprinzip, Internationaler Geltungsbereich des Strafrechts, Begriff und 
Systematieserung der Straftat, (Duncker & Humblot, 2008), p. 64.   
100. See Vigano, “Prescrizione e reati lesivi degli interessi finanziari dell’UE: la Corte 
d’appello di Milano sollecita la Corte costituzionale ad azionare i ‘controlimiti’”, <www.penale  
contemporaneo.it/> (last visited 16 Dec. 2015) and Scalia, op. cit. supra note 97, 107. 
101. See about this doctrine Claes, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 186 and 195.  
102. Case C-399/11, Melloni.  
103. Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson.   
104. See further Dougan, “Judicial review of Member State action under the general 
principles and the Charter: Defining the ‘scope of Union law’”, 52 CML Rev. (2015), 1201–
1245.  
 
 
(p. 794) law.
105
 The Court’s reasoning in Taricco certainly implies that the 
application of the more protective Italian legality principle would indeed 
compromise the primacy and effectiveness of EU law.
106
 This is because the 
ECJ found the  
application of the Italian limitation rules to be at odds with the duty to provide 
effective sanctions, which has the status of primary law,
107
 and with the 
precedence of primary Union law that enshrines that duty.
108
 As a 
consequence of Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson, the national court will thus 
be required to disapply the Italian limitation rules even if this would violate 
the Italian legality principle. 
In this regard, Taricco is merely a logical consequence of the reasoning in 
the related ECJ judgments in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson. Nevertheless,  
Taricco contains potential for further controversy, because it appears to  
require the disapplication of a constitutionally protected fundamental right in 
favor of the minimum protection provided by EU law.
109
 Unlike Taricco, the 
judgments in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson involved fundamental rights 
that, arguably, provided more protection than the minimum ECHR standard. 
Melloni, on the one hand, concerned a fundamental right that was explicitly 
harmonized by secondary Union law “in order to enhance the procedural  
rights of persons subject to criminal proceedings whilst improving mutual 
recognition”.
110
 Åkerberg Fransson, on the other hand, concerned the ne bis in  
idem principle,
111
 which has been given an expansive protection under EU law 
in light of its free movement enhancing potential.
112
 One could therefore argue  
that, since EU law itself provided more protection than the required minimum 
in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson, the possible disapplication of a more  
protective national standard was not that problematic in those circumstances. 
That argumentation is, however, clearly unavailable in Taricco, since the ECJ 
is generally only willing to provide the minimum ECHR standard of protection 
for the legality principle. As a consequence, Taricco explicitly 
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(p. 795) involves a constitutional conflict between the minimum fundamental 
rights protection provided by EU law and a more protective national 
constitutional 
standard. 
Since Taricco implies that, by virtue of Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson, 
the minimum protection provided by EU law’s legality principle precludes 
the application of the Italian constitutional standard, it would have been 
reasonable to expect the Court to have recognized the potential for 
constitutional conflict. Had the ECJ indeed proceeded that way, it should 
have examined the Member States’ common constitutional traditions with 
regard to the relationship between the legality principle and limitation 
rules.
113
 A reference to the common constitutional traditions could have 
increased the legitimacy of the Court’s interpretation of EU law’s legality 
principle.
114
 It might have, moreover, convinced the Italian Constitutional 
Court to bring its interpretation of the Italian legality principle in 
conformity with that standard or, conversely, it might have put the Italian 
court in the position to explicitly justify its deviating interpretation by 
referring to, for example, Italian constitutional identity.
115
 Although the 
ECJ missed the above-mentioned opportunities to open a judicial dialogue 
about a potential conflict, it may get another chance if the Italian 
Constitutional Court refers its case on the impending constitutional conflict 
for a preliminary ruling.
116
 The ECJ could then clarify its interpretation of 
the legality principle and the relationship between effective criminal 
penalties and the standards of fundamental rights protection. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Since Taricco apparently requires Italy to lower its legality protection to the 
minimum standard in cases of VAT fraud, the Court could have explained its 
approach to the national legal order with a more elaborate reasoning. Such a 
reasoning might have, moreover, avoided or diminished the looming conflict 
with the Italian Constitutional Court. The absence of an elaborate reasoning is 
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(p. 796) therefore not only disappointing from a legal perspective, it is also, 
possibly, conflict enhancing. It is interesting to see whether primacy and 
effectiveness will continue to allow the ECJ to disregard national concerns over the 
lowering of fundamental rights protection. 
 
 
